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Abstract
This paper poses and answers a number of critical questions about the relationship
between migration and entrepreneurship in the process of economic development.
In doing so, we show that the standard policy response to migrants and migrant
entrepreneurs are often based on an inadequate understanding of migrant entrepreneurs.
The questions we pose are the following: (i) Are immigrants really more entrepreneurial
than natives? (ii) Are migrant remittances likely to fund entrepreneurship in their home
countries? (iii) Are return migrants more likely to be entrepreneurial than non-migrants?
And finally, based on the answers, (iv) Does migration matter for development? We
conclude that one must avoid seeing migrants as super-entrepreneurs and that the
(positive) developmental impact of migration is more significant through other channels.
Removal of discriminatory barriers against migrants and against migrant entrepreneurs in
labour, consumer and financial markets will promote development in both sending and
receiving countries, not least through reducing the shares of migrants that are reluctant
entrepreneurs.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship and migration are at the very top of many national and international
agendas. It is easy to see why, globally, there are probably a billion entrepreneurs (mea-
sured in terms of self-employment)1 and more than 232 million cross-border migrants
(United Nations 2013). The development impacts of both migrants and entrepreneurs
are therefore likely to be substantial. For instance, migrant remittances are estimated
to be around US dollar 550 billion annually (more than two times the volume of aid)
(World Bank 2013), and they contribute significantly to poverty reduction in some
countries (Adams and Page 2005). In the same vein, entrepreneurs invest billions and
create substantial numbers of jobs. Both migration and entrepreneurship have there-
fore attracted attention from policymakers, donors, NGOs and others interested in
their possible impacts on poverty reduction and development.
The problem is that entrepreneurship and migration policies often do more harm to
the poor and to development, than good. Naudé (2010, 2011) has dealt with the relation-
ship between entrepreneurship and development and growth, and the difficulties that
well-meaning but poorly informed policies may cause. Not all entrepreneurs create sus-
tainable or substantial jobs, most do not innovate much and substantial numbers of firms
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fail after only a few years. In such a context of heterogeneity, policies are often ineffective
and often may have undesired outcomes. For example, easing entry restrictions for poten-
tial entrepreneurs may result in a large pool of entrepreneurs with insufficient entrepre-
neurial ability and skills, which in combination with asymmetric information about their
skills and ability can result in a general contraction of finance from banks (who do not
want to lend to entrepreneurs with poor ability) (de Meza and Webb 1987). Much scarce
resources are being spent on providing training and education to prospective entrepre-
neurs with little, and even opposite than intended, outcomes. Often, participants of such
programmes only realize what it means to be an entrepreneur during the course, and as
such, their aspirations change because of this additional knowledge, even discouraging
some who had initially planned to start their own business (Oosterbeek et al. 2010).
In the case of migration, poorly informed policies have also created and continue to cre-
ate harm. Stricter border controls to prevent irregular migration from Africa to Europe,
for example, have not stopped migration flows but instead led to a diversification of mi-
gration routes and to a much more dangerous migration journey (de Haas 2009).
At the same time, the debate on the economic development implications of migration
is a long-standing and often emotional one. Recently, there has been more attention in
this debate on the role of migrant entrepreneurs. They are often hailed as super-
entrepreneurs with consequent high expectations for their role in business start-ups
and job creation. The problem is that this may mask and even exacerbate bad immigra-
tion policies, for instance, in justifying too much of a focus on attracting certain types
of migrant entrepreneurs, or training return migrants to be entrepreneurs, rather than
facilitating migrants’ access to wage employment and the formal economy.
The debate on the role of migrants in entrepreneurship more broadly is in our view
based on an inadequate understanding of migration and migrant entrepreneurs. There-
fore, in this paper, we pose and answer three questions in this regard: (i) Are immigrants
really more entrepreneurial than natives? (ii) Are migrant remittances likely to fund entre-
preneurship in their home countries? (iii) Are return migrants more likely to be entrepre-
neurial than non-migrants? We do this in Section 2 before we then, given our answers to
these three questions, ask in Section 3 whether migration matters at all for development
if not through promoting entrepreneurship. And how can “super-entrepreneurs” be nur-
tured best, given that continued migration is likely to be a demographic fact in many parts
of the world, particularly towards Europe. In Section 4, we discuss the policy implications
in the latter regard. Section 5 concludes.
2 Re-evaluating the stylized facts: critical questions
2.1 Are immigrants really more entrepreneurial than natives?
Within debates on migration and development, migrants are often expected to be super-
entrepreneurs who will benefit development in home and destination countries through
their greater prowess as entrepreneurs, their remittances, their trans-national entrepre-
neurial activity and their business acumen. Proponents of this view have pointed to the
successes of migrant entrepreneurs in China and the USA to argue that migrants may not
need formal wage jobs. For instance, it has been pointed out that in successful developing
countries, such as China, 25 % of migrants are self-employed (Giulietti et al. 2012). Saxenian
(2002, 2006) and others have praised the role of immigrants in the development of Silicon
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Valley, where close to one third of the technology businesses were operated by immigrant
owners by the end of the 1990s.
Why are migrant entrepreneurs seen as super-entrepreneurs? The main argument is
based on selection. Migrant entrepreneurs may be less risk averse, as is evident in their
decision to migrate, itself a risky activity (Neville et al. 2014). And they have been ar-
gued to be more able to spot opportunities for new businesses as they already spotted
opportunities for migration (Hart and Acs 2011). Migrants are also seen to have access
to supplementary sources of support, training and financing, as often migrants increase
their educational level and/or gain new skills, save more money and extend their social
network while living abroad (de Haas 2006; OECD 2008).
Despite these a priori reasons for seeing migrant entrepreneurs as super-
entrepreneurs, and in fact being more entrepreneurial than natives, the empirical evi-
dence is not strong. For instance, a recent OECD (2010) review finds that migrant
entrepreneurship, measured by self-employment rates, is more common than non-
migrant entrepreneurship in only 13 out of 25 countries in the OECD. In other words,
in about half of these OECD countries, migrants are less likely than natives to be self-
employed. Moreover, in the countries with larger immigrant populations, such as
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and The Netherlands, migrants are much less likely
than natives to be self-employed (OECD 2010). In the case of migrants in Germany,
Brixy et al. (2013) even find that migrants believe less often that they have the neces-
sary skills to run a business and that they were not more risk averse than non-
migrants. And in the case of The Netherlands, Jansen et al. (2003) find the rate of
entrepreneurship amongst the native Dutch population as well as of the Turkish immi-
grant population to be almost twice as high as amongst immigrant populations from
Morocco, Suriname and the Antilles.
The only study to compare start-up rates (early entrepreneurial activity) amongst mi-
grants and non-migrants across countries is the 2012 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM). It finds that rates of early entrepreneurial activity (start-up rates) are similar be-
tween migrants and non-migrants and that start-up rates of migrants are just as heteroge-
neous across countries as that of non-migrants. For instance, the GEM finds that only
1.8 % of early entrepreneurial activity in Sub-Saharan Africa is undertaken by first gener-
ation migrants, while the corresponding share is 11 and 10 % in the USA and Western
Europe, respectively (Vorderwülbecke 2012).
Self-employment per se may, however, be a poor measure of entrepreneurship. Many
argue that what fundamentally characterizes entrepreneurs is their innovativeness, their
creative destruction to use Schumpeter’s term. So how well do migrant entrepreneurs do
in terms of innovation? It has been pointed out that migrant entrepreneurs may be dis-
proportionately represented, at least in the USA, amongst high-growth2 and highly in-
novative enterprises (OECD 2011; Saxenian 2002; Wadhwa et al. 2007) and biotech firms
(Stephan and Levin 2001) as well as public venture-backed US companies (Anderson and
Platzer 2006) and high-impact companies (Hart and Acs 2011). In addition, on average,
20 % of migrant-owned enterprises in the 2012 GEM survey expected to create ten or
more jobs in the next 5 years, compared to only 14 % of non-migrant-owned enterprises
(Vorderwülbecke 2012).
As far as innovation is concerned, around 16 % of high-tech firms in a recent US
sample had a migrant owner and, moreover, a migrant owner with skills in science and
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engineering (Hart and Acs 2011). Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), using US patent
data, find that “immigrants account for 24 [per cent] of patents, twice their share in the
population, and that the skilled immigrant patenting advantage over natives is entirely
accounted for by immigrants’ disproportionately holding degrees in science and engin-
eering fields” (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010: 33). Despite the clear contributions
that migrant entrepreneurs have made to innovation in the USA, Hart and Acs (2011)
cannot find evidence that migrant owned high-tech firms in the USA are more likely to
register patents or spend more on research and development than firms owned by na-
tives. Supporting this point, the survey by Hart and Acs (2011) of high-tech entrepre-
neurship (the most innovative form of entrepreneurship) in the USA concluded that
“most previous studies have overstated the role of immigrants in high-tech entrepre-
neurship” (Hart and Acs 2011: 116).
The 2012 GEM survey attempted to measure the innovation of enterprises across 69
countries using the number of new products or services they introduced, taking into
account whether the enterprises in question were owned by a migrant or non-migrant.
Analyses of the survey results could not find significant differences between the innova-
tiveness of migrant and non-migrant entrepreneurs (Vorderwülbecke 2012).
As a final measure of the entrepreneurial prowess of migrants, one may compare the
average performance of migrant enterprises to that of non-migrants. Using perform-
ance measures such as sales growth and profits from new Canadian start-ups, Neville
et al. (2014) find that migrant enterprises are not generally better performing than
those of non-migrants and that very often immigrant-owned firms underperformed.
Only in the case of migrant firms that export do they find superior performance, sug-
gesting that these migrant firms may have better international networks. The usual sus-
pects in firm performance such as experience, skills, gender, access to finance and
growth orientation were found to apply in equal measure to both migrant and non-
migrant enterprises. Similarly, Dai and Lui (2009) find that in the case of China’s
Zhongguancun Science Park (ZSP), return migrants who export more, due to their
international networks, performed better than non-migrants.
Saxenian (2002, 2006) and others have argued that the development of high-tech sec-
tors and innovation clusters in countries such as China, India and Taiwan resulted due
to the return migration of entrepreneurs (transnational entrepreneurs) from places like
Silicon Valley and elsewhere in the USA. More recently, Kenney et al. (2012) challenged
this interpretation, concluding from a historical overview of the creation and establish-
ment of ICT industries in these countries that return migrants were not critical in their
establishment. They conclude that the roles of native entrepreneurs and governments
were more essential for the emergence and establishment of these industries than re-
turn migrants and that “[t]he importance of the returnees is more likely in […] deepen-
ing home country industrial development and connections to the U.S. economy”
(Kenney et al. 2012: 395).
2.2 Are migrant remittances likely to fund entrepreneurship in their home countries?
In the new economics of labour migration (NELM), the decision to migrate is seen as
not only a decision an individual makes but also a decision that is taken at the house-
hold level to deal with risks, market imperfections and obstacles in their environment.
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If, for instance, a lack of liquidity and/or poorly functioning financial markets obstruct
households to establish business enterprises, migration of some family members and
their remittances may be a way of overcoming these financial constraints, making it
possible for them to invest in agricultural innovations, land and housing, or small busi-
nesses (Lucas and Stark 1985).
The literature on the impact of remittances on development contains controversial
findings. On the one hand, there exists a somewhat pessimistic view of the role of re-
mittances, recognizing negative effects such as moral hazard (Chami et al. 2005) as well
as exchange rate appreciation and reduced export competitiveness (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo 2004; Bourdet and Falck 2006). On the other hand, a more optimistic view em-
phasizes that remittances can contribute to poverty reduction, consumption smoothing
and household expenditures (Acosta et al. 2007; Adams 2006). Remittances can also raise
household spending on education (Acosta et al. 2007; Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003) and
health services (Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005; Mansuri 2007). In addition, part of re-
mittances that are received by households may be used for savings or investments (de
Haas 2005). Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) show that in some countries with under-
developed financial systems, remittances are used to overcome credit and liquidity con-
straints and are invested into small business development. They find that when the
development of the financial sectors is lower, the contribution of remittances to economic
growth is stronger (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009).
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of remittances to encourage entrepre-
neurship in migrant sending countries is, however, also mixed. For instance, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2004) show that in the case of the Dominican Republic, receiving
remittances does not lead to an increased likelihood of owning a business, but rather
the opposite. Remittance receipt is associated with a reduced likelihood of business op-
erations. It has also been observed that households, who already operate a business, are
more likely to receive remittances from abroad (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004).
Vasco (2013), studying migration and remittances in the case of rural Ecuador finds
that “neither migration nor remittances have any effect on the odds of a household
owning a rural business” (Vasco 2013: 37). Ang et al. (2009) also do not find a signifi-
cant effect of remittances on productive investments in the Philippines.
In the case of Mexico, on the other hand, remittances have been found to be a signifi-
cant source of capital for microenterprises (López-Córdova and Olmedo 2006). Invest-
ments in businesses are increasingly seen in Mexican households and communities
receiving remittances from the USA (Massey and Parado 1998). Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007) also find that small and medium enterprises in Mexico benefit financially from
having links to migrant networks in the USA and that in the case of high-tech firms,
they grow faster as a result, suggesting that migrant networks can alleviate financial
constraints. In the case of Nicaragua, Funkhouser (1992) establishes that remittances
have a small positive effect on self-employment in receiving households. In El Salvador,
in contrast, remittances did not seem to impact self-employment activities in a house-
hold survey conducted in 2000. International remittances were, however, significantly
and positively associated with business ownership. These effects were particularly
strong in rural areas and amongst females (Acosta 2007).
Yang (2008) estimates the responses of Filipino households to economic shocks in
the destination country of migrated household members. He shows that a positive
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shock leads to increased levels of investment in entrepreneurship in the origin house-
holds. Vaaler (2011) finds evidence that remittances support venture capital funds and
firm start-ups in home countries, especially when they come from migrants living in
migrant communities abroad. The effects decrease when the remittances are sent by
highly educated migrants (Vaaler 2011).
Besides the direct use of remittances for business investments, remittances might also
indirectly contribute to the ability of a recipient household to engage in business activ-
ities. A stable remittance income may be considered a positive attribute in the evalu-
ation of creditworthiness of a household when it comes to accessing microloans or
small business loans (Ratha 2007). Especially in contexts where households face high-
income volatility and shocks otherwise, remittances can also favour income smoothing
and as such make households more attractive borrowers (Mohapatra et al. 2011).
Overall, however, most of the literature on development and migration seems to con-
cur that remittances are largely used to fund consumption (de Haas 2010), which is not
necessarily a bad thing for households in the poorest countries (Yang 2011). Whether
remittances are used for business investments and self-employment activities is highly
dependent on the context as is shown by the mixed evidence on the relationship
between the two. It seems that it matters where the remittances come from, where
they go and who is then responsible for the way they are used in the receiving
household. As such, more research is necessary in order to really understand the
interactions between remittances and entrepreneurship and to establish under what
conditions migrant remittances are likely to fund entrepreneurship in their home
countries.
2.3 Are return migrants more likely to be entrepreneurial than non-migrants?
While there is a growing literature on the development impacts of the rising flows of
remittances to poorer countries, it is only fairy recently that attention has been paid to the
potential of return migrants to start up enterprises in their home countries. This reflects
the greater awareness of the fact that most migration is not permanent, but temporary
(Mesnard 2004). Hence, migrants may learn while away from their home country or re-
gion, as well as gather savings and build foreign networks, all of which may alleviate con-
straints on starting a new enterprise upon return (Marchetta 2012; Rapoport 2002).
However, while abroad, migrants may lose contact with their networks at home and hence
experience a depreciation of their social capital, which may make it more difficult to estab-
lish a new enterprise upon return. Accordingly, to the extent that credit constraints and a
lack of skills and experience are obstacles to entrepreneurship in developing countries,
and social capital is not as crucial, one may expect return migrants to be more likely to be
able to start up new firms than non-migrants (Wahba and Zenou 2012).
How valid is this expectation? Black and Costaldo (2009) report that the literature is
not unambiguously supporting this expectation and, moreover, that the types of busi-
nesses started up by return migrants most often do not have a significant development
impact. Gibson and McKenzie (2012) find microeconomic evidence from five develop-
ing countries that return migration is common and that although return migrants share
gained knowledge, they are not more productive as entrepreneurs or in wage labour
back home than non-migrants.
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There are several studies investigating differences in entrepreneurial activities be-
tween return migrants and non-migrants. The most common finding relates to finan-
cial capital, and more specifically, the role of savings accumulated abroad in the launch
of a small business upon return. For instance, both Arif and Irfan (1997) and Piracha
and Vadean (2010) find strong indication that return migrants are more likely to be
self-employed in business in comparison to non-migrants in Pakistan and Albania, re-
spectively. Using data from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, Black and Costaldo (2009) find
that return migrants are more likely to start a new enterprise if they had accumulated
savings and stayed abroad longer. This trend was found to be stronger amongst poorer
migrants. They also find any formal education received by migrants while abroad to be
insignificant for the entrepreneurship decision once they have returned. Similar results
were obtained for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Romania
and Tajikistan by Lianos and Pseiridis (2009) and by McCormick and Wahba (2001) for
Egypt. Ilahi (1999), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) and Mesnard (2004) arrive at a simi-
lar conclusion showing return migrants are particularly prone to invest savings from
abroad in business ventures back home, suggesting temporary migration may at times be
employed as a strategy to overcome credit constraints faced in the country of origin.
In the case of rural to urban migration in China, Démurger and Xu (2011) find that
return migrants were more likely than non-migrants to start up an enterprise and that
the likelihood of this was enhanced by the amount of savings accumulated and the ex-
perience gained as measured by the frequency of job changes. Also for China, Giulietti
et al. (2013) find that not only return migrants are more likely than non-migrants to
start up a business but also they promote entrepreneurship amongst family members
who did not migrate, suggesting that knowledge and experience may be skills required
in China’s rural areas to stimulate entrepreneurship.
Wahba and Zenou (2012), using migration data from Egypt, also find that experience,
savings and duration abroad matter and that the loss of social capital due to being out of
the country does not outweigh the benefits of finance and experiences in starting up a
firm. Their evidence indicates that return migrants could indeed be more likely to become
self-employed; however, they do recognize that the decision of a migrant to return could
be a decision made simultaneously to that of becoming an entrepreneur, which would up-
wardly bias the propensity of return migrants to be found in entrepreneurship; they find
evidence of such an upward bias in their data (Wahba and Zenou 2012). Similar evidence
of bias, and of the simultaneity in the decisions to migrate and become entrepreneurial, is
found by Batista et al. (2014) in the case of return migration in Mozambique.
Problems faced by studies into the occupational choice of return migrants and the
probability that they enter into entrepreneurship are often caused by endogeneity and
simultaneity in the decisions to migrate and to start a new enterprise and due to the
fact that the total population of return migrants is not available. Little has been done in
the way of controlled (or natural) experiments, and properly matched panel data is still
scarce, although a number of studies have used bivariate probit models and instru-
mental variable methods to deal with endogeneity issues. As a result of these short-
comings and given the relatively few studies on the topic, a recent survey on
migration and development concluded that there is still much scope for further re-
search on the determinants and impacts of return migration and entrepreneurship
(Gurgand et al. 2012).
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3 Does migration matter for development?
With the focus of this paper on the linkages between migration, entrepreneurship and
development, it is important to take a step back and look at the linkages between mi-
gration and development more generally because (migrant) entrepreneurship is but one
possible channel. De Haas (2010) provides a critical overview of the literature on mi-
gration and development and shows that this body of work has vacillated between pes-
simism and optimism over time. Based on the neoclassical theory of migration, opinion
in the 1950s and 1960s was that migration had a generally positive impact on develop-
ment reflecting a virtuous circle of labour mobility that would eventually even-off in
the long term (Castles 2008). The Lewis and Harris-Todaro models, for example, as-
sume out-migration from low productivity areas to be essential for rising productivity
(Harris and Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954). This view changed in the 1970s and 1980s, when
migration became more widely seen as being part of a vicious circle of under-development,
which widened the gap between core and periphery countries. Migration was blamed for
maintaining economic dependencies between rich and poor countries by causing a brain-
drain from poor to rich economies. However, before the recent (2013–2016) rise in immi-
gration to Europe (mainly as a result of conflict in the Middle East and Eastern Africa), the
pendulum had started to swing back towards a more positive assessment of the develop-
ment impact of migration, with notions of a brain gain being modified to account for brain
circulation (Mountford 1997; Saxenian 2006; Docquier and Rapoport 2012).
Recent theorizing on migration and development is based on the New Economics of
Labour Migration (NELM) and livelihood approaches (de Haas 2010) which take a more
holistic view of migration and development. Different aspects of migration, such as the
role of diasporas,3 have surfaced, and migrants are seen as agents of development, leading
to more nuanced research. For instance, migration has been established to have brain-
drain effects only for some of the poorest countries (Di Maria and Stryszowski 2009; Beine
et al. 2008). In addition, new evidence suggests that out-migration of highly skilled indi-
viduals has substantial benefits, mainly for “the migrants themselves, who benefit through
massive gains in income and through greater human capital” (Gibson and McKenzie
2012: 371). Migration has also been found to contribute to raising living standards of
those left behind (Acosta et al. 2007; Adams 1991, 2004, 2006; Adams and Page 2003,
2005; Itzigsohn 1995; Taylor et al. 2005) as well as increased human capital, brain gain
and better return to human capital investments (Mountford 1997; Stark and Wang 2002).
The role of remittances has been the subject of special scrutiny given their sheer vol-
ume. Remittances have significant welfare impacts on countries with large out-migration,
for example, Jamaica and El Salvador (Di Giovanni et al. 2015), although this is more the
case when low-skilled individuals migrate than in the case of higher-skilled migrants, who
tend to remit less in per capita terms (Adams 2009).4 Remittances can also facilitate in-
creases in household spending on education (Acosta et al. 2007; Cox Edwards and Ureta
2003), health services (Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005; Mansuri 2007) and savings or in-
vestments (de Haas 2005). There is, however, no conclusive evidence that remittances un-
ambiguously promote macroeconomic growth (Yang 2011).
Others have argued that out-migration does not only lead to higher levels of trade
(Egger et al. 2012; Fairlie and Lofstrom 2013; Rauch and Trindade 2002) and FDI (Kugler
and Rapoport 2011) to developing countries but also contributes to development through
“social remittances.” “Social remittances are the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social
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capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt 1998: 927).
They can be transferred to the origin country through modern communication methods
such as telephone, internet and mail, through migrants’ temporary return visits to their
origin country or through permanent return. Migrants transfer their know-how and skills
to family members or friends living in the origin country, and this knowledge can then be
utilized by individuals or households in the home country.
In this context, Docquier et al. (2016) and Spilimbergo (2009) show that the level of
emigration is related to political developments in the home country. Migrants can con-
tribute to the diffusion of democratic values and norms either directly upon return or
through contacts with relatives or indirectly through social networks connecting the di-
asporas with groups in the origin country (Docquier et al. 2016). Some have even ar-
gued that return migrants can increase the demand for political accountability and so
improve governance in their home countries (Batista and Vincente 2011). However, the
opposite can also hold; Stel (2013) for instance finds that in the case of the Lebanese
diaspora, migrants often play an active role in entrenching political power in their
home country.
We can conclude this section by stating that even though migrant entrepreneurs are
not super-entrepreneurs, migration as a process can positively impact development in
both sending and receiving countries through many other channels. The entrepreneur-
ial behaviour of migrants and migrant households is only one of the channels through
which migration may affect economic growth. Because economic growth and develop-
ment in itself affect entrepreneurship (entrepreneurship is endogenous to develop-
ment), this has to be taken into account in policies that aim to maximize the potential
of migrant entrepreneurs. In the following section, we discuss how policies for migra-
tion and migrant entrepreneurship may be improved.
4 Policy implications: can migrant super-entrepreneurs be created?
Migration has the potential to contribute to development. But not all individuals and
all countries benefit automatically from migration: There is much country and individ-
ual heterogeneity in migration-development outcomes. In this respect, de Haas (2010)
has cautioned against simplified assumptions about the relationship between migration
and development. He points out that there “is no automatic mechanism by which inter-
national migration leads to development” (de Haas 2010: 240). This means that policies
may matter very much in migration and, moreover, that migration policies may do much
harm to development by distorting outcomes. Because of the nature of the public and pol-
icy debates on migration (characterized very often by a high degree of subjectivity), the
need for an automatic mechanism of development through migration has concentrated
attention in recent years on the role on migrants as entrepreneurs and facilitators of
entrepreneurship.
An individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur or not has been studied by econo-
mists as an occupational choice. In empirically studying this occupational choice, the evi-
dence tends to suggest that the occupational choices of migrants are not significantly
different from those of non-migrants. Both migrants and non-migrants would be more or
less likely to be entrepreneurs as a result of their individual characteristics (schooling, ex-
perience), household or community level factors (size of household, cultural background),
institutional determinants (access to finance) and the business environment. Based on
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existing evidence, it therefore does not seem like migrant entrepreneurs face significant
other challenges than non-migrants—apart from discrimination.
Migrant entrepreneurs, like migrants in general, suffer from various forms of discrim-
ination (Jansen et al. 2003; Zhou 2004). Bruder and Räthke-Döppner (2008) mention
that migrants often face discrimination in formal labour markets, which then drives
them into (necessity) self-employment. This can be due to structural discrimination
(the need for a visa for example); taste discrimination (when employers prefer not to
employ workers of a certain ethnicity due to, amongst others, racial or ethnic stereo-
typing and language barriers) and statistical discrimination (when employers and job
seekers have asymmetrical information about their quality) (Bruder and Räthke-Döppner,
2008). Rising xenophobia has been found to push disproportionate numbers of migrants
with limited English proficiency into self-employment in the USA (Mora and Davila
2007). That discrimination and xenophobia foster self-employment amongst migrants is
thus acknowledged. Hence, entrepreneurship can be used as a way to circumvent these
obstacles (OECD 2010) and for migrants to overcome social exclusion and integrate bet-
ter with their host community (Constant et al. 2007) as well as a way to improve their so-
cioeconomic mobility (Zhou 2004).
A number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of labour market discrim-
ination on the occupational choices of migrants in China, where legal discrimination,
through for instance the Hukou system,5 is well known. Frijters et al. (2011) find that if
there would be no discrimination against migrants in urban China, the number of self-
employed migrants would fall by 16 %, a significant proportion. Thus, when they have
a choice, migrants may often prefer wage employment to being self-employed. This
conclusion is supported by the empirical patterns of migrant self-employment in the
OECD (OECD 2010) as well as studies from, e.g., Germany which find that it is more
likely for less educated migrants to be self-employed than for higher educated migrants
(Constant and Zimmermann 2006).
Migrants also face discrimination in consumer markets, which in turn creates a de-
mand for the goods and services migrant entrepreneurs can provide, often in ethnic en-
claves (Jansen et al. 2003). Hence, ethnic enclaves often act as a pull factor for migrants
to enter into self-employment (Price and Chacko 2009). Finally, migrant entrepreneurs
themselves do face discrimination, especially when trying to gain access to finance
(Zhang 2008).
As a result, migrant entrepreneurs may be very vulnerable to external shocks because they
are often in entrepreneurship due to a lack access to wage employment (Brixy et al. 2013).
In other words, they are necessity entrepreneurs (Constant and Zimmermann 2006). More-
over, they often have access only to types of businesses, e.g. in trade and services, which are
more exposed to external economic shocks (OECD 2010). The GEM study could not find
evidence across 69 countries that migrants are more likely to be necessity entrepreneurs
than non-migrants (Vorderwülbecke 2012). This does, however, not mean that it is not the
case; certainly, the finding that migrant entrepreneurs often perform worse than non-
migrants may suggest they indeed face more difficulties (Neville et al. 2014).
It should be stressed that a selection of migrant entrepreneurs occurs before migrants
even enter the host country. As the link between migration and entrepreneurship receives
more attention by policymakers, a growing number of countries are introducing specific
policy measures for this group. As immigrant entrepreneurs are a heterogeneous group
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running different types of businesses, policies should ideally be equally diverse in order
not to exclude potential future entrepreneurs (Collins 2003). However, considering pol-
icies currently implemented, it is evident that the diversity of this population is not ad-
dressed. While overall, the share of immigrants entering a country on an entrepreneur
visa is relatively small, the bulk of immigrant entrepreneurs does not qualify for this type
of visa, likely due to a lack of capital and experience, and usually enters the country
through another channel. Some of these migrants might still come with the intention of
starting their own business.
Particularly amongst highly skilled immigrants, there may also be people with high
entrepreneurial ability. In some cases, however, policy hinders the implementation of
entrepreneurial activities. Migrants entering on a work visa, for example, may not be
allowed to start a business while on this specific visa. This may be a waste of their po-
tential contribution to the local economy. An example from The Netherlands is that of
“knowledge migrants” who are only allowed to work for their current employer. They
are not allowed to start their own business next to this employment while on a know-
ledge migrant visa. At the same time, it is common for academics to start their own
(consultancy) business next to their university work; this type of entrepreneurship is,
however, restricted in the case of The Netherlands (Marchand and Siegel 2015).
When looking at return migrants and entrepreneurship, it can be observed that pol-
icies and programmes are also sometimes developed based on overly positive assump-
tions. An example of this is the fact that increasingly voluntary return programmes
contain entrepreneurship components of different format. Some simply provide in-kind
or financial support, while others also offer training. The fact that this support is often
given to people with no prior experience in running a business and may be even no
interest in doing so can in this context be seen as a form of positive discrimination. It
is, however, the case that evaluations of such programmes are largely lacking. In order
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of such programmes, more evidence is
therefore needed.
Overall, it can be seen that there are several factors that on the one hand drive mi-
grants into entrepreneurship, such as the discrimination on the labour market, while
on the other hand, access to finance and policies often hinder potential entrepreneurs
to put their plans into action and play the role that many expect of them. Other pol-
icies and programmes drive migrants into entrepreneurship that are not necessarily
suited for this.
5 Conclusions
Migration can be an important mechanism for raising the welfare of individuals and house-
holds in both sending and receiving countries. One way is through the entrepreneurial ac-
tivities of migrants and their families. Based on the theoretical notion that migrants, like
entrepreneurs, tend to be less risk averse, they are often seen as super-entrepreneurs. We
argued in this paper that the discussion on the linkages between migration and entrepre-
neurship need however to be more nuanced. We cast doubt on three stylized facts or beliefs
on migration and entrepreneurship namely that (i) migrants are more entrepreneurial than
natives, (ii) migrant remittances can fund start-ups in the countries of origin and (iii) return
migration can bring valuable entrepreneurial skills to developing home countries. Consider-
ing the empirical evidence, none of these are robust beliefs.
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In fact, the evidence is mixed on the question whether immigrants are more likely to
be self-employed than natives as well as whether immigrant entrepreneurs outperform
their native counterparts. For policies to indeed support the promotion of migrant
super-entrepreneurs, policymakers and scholars need to first better understand the
broader relationship between migration and development, and entrepreneurship and
development, as this indicates that migrants often make a more substantial impact on
development not as entrepreneurs, but as employees, and that the success of those who
do select into entrepreneurship does critically depend on the state of the economy
(-ies) in which they are embedded.
In this respect, it needs to be reiterated that immigrants most often face discrimin-
ation in their destination country. This may either prevent potential entrepreneurs
from actively pursuing business activities or drive immigrants into necessity entrepre-
neurship that may otherwise prefer wage employment. Non-discrimination policies, ad-
dressing stereotyping and prejudging of immigrants would be beneficial in order to
ensure maximization of productivity and the contributions of migrants to the local
economy. Not all discrimination stems from active resistance against foreigners. Typic-
ally, immigrants face more difficulties in obtaining credit than their native counterparts,
especially forced migrants who have left all their assets and networks behind. This type
of bias against migrant entrepreneurship is more difficult, although not impossible, to
address with policy. Such policies should for instance take into account that if migrants
need to rebuild their collateral and assets, and invest in the local economy, a long-term
vision and commitment to the host country is needed. Without longer-term residence
permits and integration measures, it is unlikely to happen though.
Given that migrant entrepreneurs have not been proven to be super-entrepreneurs in
this paper and given that there is a significant demand for low-skilled workers in most
advanced economies, particularly in Europe (de Haas 2009) (including a structural de-
mand for more workers in general, given declines in population growth6), imposing
policies based on the view of migrants as super-entrepreneurs is likely to be sub-
optimal. The costs of misunderstanding the potential of migrant entrepreneurs, or rais-
ing immigration barriers, and of not doing more to allow their integration into wage
employment, is thus likely to be costly.
In conclusion, the message is that not all migrants are entrepreneurs and that differ-
ent kinds of migrants are much more likely to end up in entrepreneurship, with differ-
ent success rates. More research along these lines is therefore necessary, so that the
dialogue is not so much on migration and entrepreneurship, but rather on, for example,
highly skilled migrants and entrepreneurship, forced return migrants and entrepreneur-
ship, or immigrants and necessity versus opportunity entrepreneurship. Different kinds
of migration as well as different kinds of entrepreneurship ultimately also have different
implications for development. Further research along these lines is therefore needed in
order to fully understand the dynamics guiding the interactions between migration,
entrepreneurship and development.
Endnotes
1In 2012, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) estimated that there were 400
million entrepreneurs in the 54 countries that were surveyed alone, less than half the
number of countries in the world (Kelley et al. 2012).
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2A high-growth enterprise is defined as an enterprise whose sales grow by at least
20 % annually for 3 years and employs at least ten workers (OECD, 2010).
3Diasporas are “groups of emigrants who leave their countries of origin for a prolonged
period of time but still demonstrate a strong link with their migration history and a sense
of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background” (Kotabe et al. 2013:3).
4It is also the case that middle-income countries receive more remittances per capita
than low-income countries (Adams 2009), and the countries with the most sizable
amount of remittances are the most populous emerging economies namely India, China,
Mexico, the Philippines and Nigeria (Yang 2011).
5China uses the Hukou system (Household Registration System) to regulate internal
migration in the country. Introduced in 1958, Hukou requires every citizen seeking a
change in residence to obtain permission from the public security bureau. Public benefits
as well as access to schools, health care and attractive employment opportunities are only
available to those who are registered (Bao et al. 2011).
6Some regions, such as Europe, will have to enter into a “global race for talent”
(Münz 2014). Chamie (2013) has mentioned that in 76 countries, populations will go into
decline without immigration. They face the choice of “more immigrants or fewer citizens”
and include countries such as Germany, Japan and Russia who need, respectively, 200,000,
230,000 and 350,000 immigrants every year to maintain their population sizes, much more
than the current inflows.
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